#Polexit, but not in my opinion.

I have read here and there about the so-called #polexit, which has excited many people, and I must say that no newspaper (so far I have read Italian, German and Anglo newspapers from different countries) has yet to put the point on the question.

So, we know that the EU must have strategic autonomy in various sectors, which are:

• energy (to have a single market and buy as a single block, to stabilize prices)
• military (to have a single staff)

Here the problem seems only to have a willingness to do it (but that's not true, because you also do things you didn't want to do) but there is something that should be said and explained about its implications.

That is why Brussels is going to a public political clash with Warsaw and Budapest, when it could resolve the dispute in a less conspicuous way, or why the EU is escalating the clash.

Up to now, the EU has been a rather complex set of treaties, which we could summarize as follows:

If we also include the candidate countries:

And that's okay, if all you want to do is a single market. The problem comes, to say, when you want (and now you want to) build a common defense, or a common energy policy?

Which of the lines shown are "your border", that is the border that these new "strategic autonomies" intend to protect? Let's focus on defense, because it is the simplest example to understand: the first thing the generals will ask will be “what are the borders to defend?”.

So, let's immediately discard the idea of ​​defending the customs union (it contains Turkey), of defending Schengen, (are we going to defend Norway and Iceland?), Ditto the EEA.

The dispute between the eurozone and the EU remains. Good. The eurozone is the one where the Euro is used, the EU the one that has the blue flag with yellow stars, in short.

Now let's ask two military dilemmas:

• someone attacks Spain. EU, Eurozone, Schengen.
• someone attacks Romania. EU, Non Schengen, Non Eurozone.

So, when Spain is attacked, there are three big “assets” at risk: currency, trade and territory. It means that if you remove Spain from the Euro, the composition of the ECB has to be recalculated, its value changes (and therefore impacts all member states), trade moves away from West Africa, and so on.

If someone attacks Romania, the EU loses some territory, but the composition of the ECB remains the same, and the Schengen area is practically not affected.

It is easy to understand that while in the case of Spain this hypothetical army would go into the berserk phase, in the case of Romania it could decide for a defensive strategy (much cheaper), leave a piece of the country as a buffer state, or other solutions.

What do I mean by this example?

In terms of defense, the members of the EU are all the same, but some are more equal than others, that is, the countries of the euro area.

The same is true for the stability of energy prices. If prices rise in France or Italy, inflation increases throughout the eurozone, and this becomes a problem for the ECB, which has to raise rates.

If, on the other hand, prices rise in Hungary, or in Sweden, it doesn't matter so much: they have their own central banks. It goes without saying that this new authority for a single market may work for the whole of the EU, but will go into alarm in different terms in the case of the Eurozone.

In short, even in terms of energy autonomy, all countries are the same but some are more equal, that is, the countries of the Euro Area.

The problem is that when it comes to defense, for example, the generals want to know which blessed borders to defend. Where to lay the foundations. And even in the case of energy autonomies, it is important to know whether we are talking only about the euro area (and therefore about the increase in prices in the euro area) or not.

What's the moral of the story?

The moral of the story is that, as "strategic autonomies" are built, more and more EU countries will be called upon to choose, definitively, whether to join the Euro NOW, or to leave the EU.

These "calls" will be more or less diplomatic, more or less visible, more or less harsh. Some countries already have a road traced in the direction of the door (remember that Poland and Hungary entered the EU at the behest of the British, who wanted to sabotage it making it ungovernable).

On the other hand, Poland does not want to leave the EU. Not only because the German economy (and the EU in general) are looming over the Polish one, but because there are (to a spanometric estimate) two or three years to go until the official dissolution of NATO. And Poland knows well that in these defensive conditions it can only become a buffer state (i.e. a state in which no one invests anymore) between the EU and Russia, at best, or suffer much more heavily from Russian influence. up to Ukrainian levels. (a country with a kind of civil war with Russian-speaking minorities).

It is in this context that everything must be seen: while "strategic autonomies" are being defined in various sectors, it is increasingly urgent to establish coherent boundaries for the various "areas of interest".

Once it is clear that for obvious reasons no government will want to join the Euro, the game of Brussels is to try to throw them out. Which, today, is simple: just do not consult them on the construction of the defensive system, nor on the construction of the European energy system. (and for the icing on the cake, Poland forgets the Recovery fund, but I think this is known in the news. The conditions are everywhere, not for nothing has Italy had to reform the justice system: precisely the same issue of conflict with Poland, which means that the recovery fund has the tools to cut out Poland and Hungary).

We must expect that, clean, loud or quiet, an ultimatum will come to nine nations:

• Poland
• Czech Republic
• Hungary
• Denmark
• Sweden
• Croatia
• Romania
• Bulgaria

Soon they will have to choose whether to enter the Euro zone or leave the EU. The price is, as "strategic autonomies" grow (that on weapons and technology is about to arrive – whatever that means), it is to be among those who sow (the EU) but never among those who reap (The eurozone).

Likewise, Ireland and Cyprus will be asked to join Schengen.

What it means "will be asked" is difficult to predict: the nations that have a clear road towards the exit, such as Poland and Hungary, will probably be forced to leave taking advantage of ongoing controversies. To say, even Portugal, Italy and Germany have sentences that say "the Constitution comes before the EU treaty", but only in the case of Poland is the problem swelling up to become dramatic.

I don't even know which and how many countries will accept the offer, but when we see these "clashes" we remember that it is a dramatic and painful process: defining the boundaries of this "Europe", in order to defend and administer them. .