The melodrama of the Coronabond.

The Coronabond affair is taking on increasingly pathetic levels, even to the extent that the Italian government does not realize that citizens of other countries, reading a different press, are not experiencing the pandemic in the same way.

Furthermore, Italians seem very capable of grasping the profound cultural difference between Rovigo and Ferrara, but when it comes to perceiving cultural differences with other countries, they dismiss them by saying "the whole world is a country". Thus, Italian politicians have given interviews to German newspapers, convincing the population to be liars , that is, people to whom no one would grant a loan.

Even the story that greens and SPD are in favor of the coronabond should be downsized: in the opposition everyone wants the opposite of the government , but when you are in government you are responsible for public finances, and everything changes.

But let's go to the first point: why did the various politicians who gave interviews to newspapers make the figure of liars? Both for some clever translators, but also for the fact that you cannot say that coronabond is not sharing debt, but sharing debt , and going for an honest person.

Seeing the rip-off is simple: let's assume that the debt is NOT mutualized: at that point, why do you need Germany to participate? Southern European countries could also build their own fund, make money as collateral and issue their bond. But if they did, one ingredient would be missing: the fool who pays debts. So if it cannot be done without the countries of northern Europe, it is simply because in the basket they would have the role of guarantee . But one forgets that "guaranteeing for a debt" means taking it on. Or rather, the Italians forget it: the Germans know very well that if you put a signature to guarantee a debt, in case things go wrong you have to cover the debt.

Gentiloni has therefore made us a liar figure, and this will stiffen German public opinion, which is already against it.

Now the objection will be that then Europe is absent. But this argument is simple to demolish with a question: why must it be coronabond and not any other combination that provides money?

The answer is simple: in the case of bonds, nobody controls how you spend them . Just as Renzi's government made 250 billion in new debt, and it is not known where those 250 billion went, in the case of the coronabond the government would pocket the money, but nobody would have the right to ask how it is spent.

If, however, the figures go through the ESM, or the EIB, or even the fund for layoffs, these institutions have the right to control how the money is spent. The money from layoffs must be spent on layoffs and not to feed the whores of some politicians, the EIB's money must be invested, the ESM money must be used for emergency financial practices.

This presence of European institutions, curiously, is not welcome. For the Italian media, that is, Europe is absent if it does not hunt the lira, but then it must disappear . A curious concept of the presence of Europe as governance that does not govern, if not at the time of paying.

We must ask ourselves: is Europe more present with the coronabond, or with MES, EIB and Sure, or with the coronabond? If by presence we talk about governance , surely there is much more Europe with MES, EIB and Sure, because not only is there money, but there is also the government of this expenditure, that is, Europe decides how they are spent and check what happens, that is, they behave like a government .

But the Italians no longer want Europe . They want more European money. Europe, which everyone accuses of being absent, after paying should … return absent .

One thing must be understood: if the Eurobond, or the coronabond, were made, any Italian would see that money as he saw the 250 billion loaned by Renzi. You would never see them.

If the Sure gives you 50 billion for the layoff, the workers will see some lira, because Sure verifies that they are spent on the layoff. But if you issued ten times as much, say 500 billion coronabonds, for the same redundancy fund, you can be sure that the workers in difficulty would see exactly ZERO .

Because nobody controls.

And that's why governments are so overwhelmed: they don't want Europe anymore, they want more European money. Because what they ask Europe is to ABSENT and NOT control how they are spent.

On the contrary, the solution with a strong PRESENCE of European institutions is seen as an affront, because all you want is for Europe to be ABSENT immediately after unstitching the money.

The rest is dialectic of victimism, with a government that has decided, according to the Mussolini tradition, to throw fifteen thousand dead on the negotiating table.

That will not work'. Merkel is back popular because she said no once, and will take advantage of this by prolonging the negotiation so she can say no more times .

I'm really afraid that the New Cassa del Mezzogiorno Europea, preferably functioning like the old Cassa del Mezzogiorno Italiana, will never take off.