I see in the Italian press controversy over the MES, the European Stability Mechanism, which according to some members of the Italian government was "taken by surprise" or unbeknownst to guy and caio. And so now the Italian press is selling the legend of the MES that is secretly approved, quietly, at night like thieves.
The first thing I would like to ask is: but it is not that the MES was discussed all the time last year, and no one ever noticed it because the Italian parliamentarians in Europe lack the healthy habit of show up for work?
And if it were instead that everyone would know about the MES, and the related work, if only IT WERE PRESENTED AT WORK in Brussels? I ask for a friend.
The first point that should be clarified, that is, is the following: but how is it that for the MES YEARS of negotiation and work have been made with delegations from all over Europe, but only Italian politicians knew nothing about it? Is it not that by chance they never presented themselves in the appropriate commissions? To think badly it becomes a sin, but …
The second point concerns the Italian press. If by chance, I say "by chance" at the MES you have been working for years, since the time when the German Constitutional Court ruled (setting limits but giving the green light), why Italian journalists in Brussels have no informed the Italians?
And if instead it was that the Italians would have known about the MES, if only the Italian press had dealt with MES and not landings, to make Salvini happy?
Having said that, that is that the MES is not a surprise and all of Europe has been working there for years, let's go to the juice. What is the MES problem?
The problem with the ESM is that it has not become the European Southern Cassa, where countries with more liquidity pay the debts of those who have mismanaged public spending.
The problem is simple: in case of saving a sovereign debt, who intervenes and how?
The hope of Italian politicians was that, after the German Constitutional Court had sent the matter back to Brussels, and received an answer, everything was downhill. No problem, if a country defaults it pays Berlin.
What no one WANTED to read is that after receiving the Brussels ruling, the Bundesverfassungsgericht issued a sentence containing precise limits. And that is that the expenses of the German state, all of them, must however be summarized by the German parliament, and must be covered, according to the German constitutional law: if the MES is done, the coverages, the spending limits, and the return must be clear of capital. It can be done, but under these conditions.
After one of the potential "main payers" decided this, obviously the whole MES plant had to take this into account. And so the fund was built by ensuring that the failure of a country's debt does not become AUTOMATICALLY an obligation for other countries.
This is because if it became mandatory it would NOT require the approval of a parliament. The difference is quite simple:
- MANDATORY: Country X goes into default -> Money arrives.
- NON-OBLIGATORY: Country X goes into default -> It assesses how much the MES covers, how much private individuals cover, what the country must do to exit from the default -> The money arrives.
The first was the "Cassa del mezzogiorno" model: aggravated money, and those who saw each other saw each other. All for free, funicoli ', funicola', iamme iamme iamme ia.
The second is the same model that applies in the private sector: if you go into bankruptcy, a bankruptcy trustee arrives who takes money from the members, cuts, sells, sells, everything you need.
Eventually the MES followed the second model. Moreover, there were no alternatives: if he had followed the first, the German constitutional court would have forbidden the president (not the chancellor) to sign the treaty. And therefore nothing treated.
What are the consequences of this?
The first is for banks.
Italian banks were under the illusion that in the event of debt default, they were never called to account for the debt they had, that is, private individuals could not be involved in restructuring. On the contrary, the agreement clearly states that private individuals can also be involved in the event of sovereign debt default.
This means that the titles in their hands are hot: for the first time in the history of the Italian Republic, Italian bankers encounter the so-called "business risk", that is a situation in which you risk, make mistakes, and in the end it's up to you to pay . So far, in one way or another, the state paid. But if the state fails and no one takes its place, now the Italian bankers must assess the risk inherent in the possession of 400 billion Italian public debt. If their reaction is to sell the debt, the situation could heat up, and a lot.
The striking thing about ABI's statements is that they say that "if conditions change": it would seem that first receiving MES money was mandatory and unconditional, while now this requirement is no longer met. But first it was anything but mandatory and unconditional: or had someone promised different things to ABI?
It would be nice to know who promised ABI that debt relief would be automatic, given that with the new MES this requirement would fall. Was it automatic before? No. And the Greeks know something about it.
I also wondered if Patuelli knows what he is saying: in fact he is downgrading the Italian debt, saying that in itself it is not part of the planned investment class, if the government does not place further guarantees. The president of Italian banks, who own 400 billion euros, should be "a bit more cautious" … maybe? Do you realize that your debt has been downgraded in practice since the first day the MES went into effect?
The second impact is on the Italian political class. Because now there is a document that speaks clearly: if Italy went into default, to access any kind of rescue it would be forced to accept the conditions imposed by the MES. It means that if some expense is cut, or some waste is reduced, it must be done. Don't give a damn what whore or relative you will be working with: it must be done. It is the situation of Tsipras: being against cuts but having to do them.
But this approach is not new: it is simply that for the first time someone has put it on paper, and is saying "signature". And now the shit hit the fan.
The surprised reactions simply show that everyone, ABI in the lead, has ignored what is happening in Brussels. They deluded themselves (and still delude themselves) that the relevant decision was that of the government of Rome. On the contrary, today they discover that in a negotiation between many states, Rome is not relevant, especially IF IT DOES NOT PRESENT IN THE COMMITTEES DUE, WITH PROPOSALS.
Which didn't happen.
Now the problem is this: but what have the Italian politicians done in recent months? Why were they not aware of decisions made by committees of which Italian politicians are also members?
Simple: because they didn't show up during the work of defining the details.
You will soon discover that, while the various ministers "did not go to Brussels", the EU did things. He did things about migrants, he did things about the economy and so much more. But no one from the yellow-green government ever showed up.
Result: now "you will discover" what happened while everyone, and I repeat everyone, discussed migrants, Papeete, Mojito and other irrelevant minchiatine.
In a sense, this disaster of the MES is the fault of the negroes: if instead of spending a year talking about immigration (which is very small compared to the past) someone had dealt with serious things, maybe things would not have gone like this.
But you see these negroes, who distract you by drowning just as the MES arrives.
Crazy stuff, isn't it?