The US lost the war in Afghanistan.

The US lost the war in Afghanistan.

For those who had fallen asleep in the last few days (a widespread habit in the Italian press), I would like to take this opportunity to remind you of news: the US is negotiating with the Taliban the conditions for the withdrawal of American soldiers from Afghanistan.

That is, the Taliban have made him a square picture.

It is useless to try to hide behind stories of all kinds: when the US attacked Afghanistan to destroy the Taliban regime, the Taliban regime was in power.

Now that, after nearly twenty years of war, the US is leaving, who is returning to power? The Taliban.

Now, imagine that in the Second World War, after twenty years of guerrilla warfare, the Allies had been forced to leave Germany and the Nazis had returned to power. Would you have called it "won war"? No.

You would have said that the invasion attempt had been stopped at the price of twenty years of guerrilla warfare, and that in the end the government that was at the beginning of the invasion won and returned.

It is useless to hide behind a finger: the Taliban were in power when the Americans arrived, and after twenty years of guerrilla warfare the Taliban still exist, and they return to power because the USA, exhausted, leave. They won and the USA lost.

The definition of victory, in fact, is the situation in which the enemy, following the fighting, loses the will (or possibility) to fight again. And that's what happened to the US.

That is, Afghanistan was another Vietnam . And with Vietnam it has several points in common, first of all the fact of having an army so specialized in destroying the infrastructures of other armies that it is practically defenseless against armies without infrastructures.

Some specialists speak of the infantryman's return in style, some speak of the futility of winning the war to dominate the sky, if the sky is not a battlefield, others are wondering if by chance the strategic superiority in a purely tactical warfare makes sense, but the point is simple.

The US lost the war in Afghanistan.

If / when they leave Afghanistan, and Trump must announce it before the next election, exactly whoever was there will be back in power: the Taliban. Who obviously will say: "they failed to destroy us, and in the end they had to go, we are here, they no longer".

Equally clear is the lesson, in practice: because of the structure of American politics, anyone who manages to drag Americans into a long war of friction and guerrilla warfare defeats them. Which means a very simple thing: against any nation that has a decent stay behind structure, the uses are WEAK.

If we think of IRAN, for example, which has a structure made of infantrymen trained and tempered by years of war, for example, a possible invasion of IRAN would be suicide. They would keep the US in check with the usual a-la-hetzbollah techniques, and after a decade those who are there today would return to power.

The beginning of this catastrophe was already seen at the time of the bombing of Serbia. The US was planning to resolve everything within a week. But the Serbs were organized like any army with a history (including Europeans) and knew their trade.

They scattered all the vehicles hiding them in industrial buildings, under road bridges, in tunnels, in cellars of private buildings, never two in the same place. And they did the same with the men and the army commands. The same as any European army today.

The result was that, after SEVENTY-EIGHT days of bombing, when the Russians persuaded them to negotiate the ceasefire, the SERBIAN ARMY WAS STILL COMPLETELY OPERATIONAL. And when NATO negotiators arrived in Belgrade, there was a regiment of Russian paratroopers at the airport, which the Serbs had helped pass, despite the fact that the sky was, in theory, covered by the USA.

It was easy to understand that a war strategy like the American one, based on aviation, was obsolete, already two decades ago. But the lesson was not understood, because theoretically Serbia was not a defeat. Not obvious, at least.

The problem is that defeat is evident with Afghanistan. And when the Taliban return to power, it will be evident to the world, whatever European newspapers do to hide it or not talk about it.

Obviously, no analyst in the highly prized Italian newspapers (and many of the European ones are of the same size) will make the simple consideration that if you leave the field to your initial enemy, then he has won.

But military analysts do a different job.

And if at the Munich conference the Germans and the French speak openly about leaving NATO behind, while the ally is present and listening, it is precisely because their military analysts all said the same thing in chorus.

The French reminded Macron that 2000 Legion paratroopers were enough to clean up Mali, and it took them just over a month. Others have pointed out that the Russians have practically wiped out the Islamic state with 2000 men and a few dozen old planes.

The disproportion between an army that is invincible only in Hollywood, compared to armies (even much smaller) who have done their homework, is alarming. The number of deaths that the US has had in Afghanistan, when compared (in proportion) to the other NATO contingents, clearly speaks of incompetence, incapacity and inconclusion.

Hollywood obviously will take precautions to provide us with the "victorious" version of the war in Afghanistan, just as the various Rambo have almost made the public believe that in the end the United States in Vietnam have won out by dint of bibs and camillus daggers.

But the trouble is that reality is fucking Hollywood.

And many are wondering if it makes sense to remain allies of an army that only wins in the cinema. Not the Italian generals, who continue to believe in that flying shack that is the F-35 (not that I imply that there is a round of bribes, huh).


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