War in Europe: Really Thwarted?

All the newspapers seem to have closed the Ukrainian question by saying that “Biden has arrived, he has threatened the Russians, and now everything is fine. Ewwiwa Biden! ". But is it really so?

The official narrative was written to be reassuring, but in the end, looking at it well, it is not at all. We can start from the fact that the Russian soldiers deployed as a threat behind the border have remained in place, to understand how nothing has changed.

Let's go into detail: Biden threatened Russia, but none of the threats are truly existential. Sure, losing access to the Forex market for the dollar is devastating to the economy, but it's not an existential threat to Russia. Harsh sanctions are a threat to the boyars in power, who might try to oust Putin (but with whom to replace him?) But once again they do not constitute an existential threat.

You can threaten a nation in two ways:

• threatening destruction by military means, or an existential threat to the nation itself.
• threatening the incumbent government to be ousted, which is an existential threat to the government itself.

Biden did neither, so he didn't really threaten . It simply increased the cost of an attack on Ukraine.

Costs can be a hindering factor in a war, but only on a strategic level, that is, when compared with the alternative.

Increasing the costs of a possible conflict by informing the opponent of the costs (and allowing him to estimate them in advance) does not stop a war: it merely makes the opponent change strategy.

It is in the context of strategy, and NOT in the context of politics, that costs are assessed. If a war is to be waged for politics, it must be waged. They are the strategists who, informed of new risks, adapt to the new scenario.

Strategy, unlike tactics, is not invented: if you have 9000 km of coastline your strategy will be to protect them, if you have a Fulda Gap your strategy will be to protect it, and so on. The strategy is the recognition of the possibilities, risks and costs generated by the scenario. It is not invented: it is elaborated starting from the scenario.

Biden simply changed the scenario: he deployed Forex and undifferentiated penalties as a cost. It will only get a change of strategy, but not of politics: if Putin has decided to go to war, he will do it. Simply, in a different way.

If the costs have changed, have Putin's motives changed? No. Ukraine is being armed, using consultants, following the same model as Poland, which has a rather operational and aggressive army.

Theoretically, Ukraine has 200,000 men in service, but at present those who can fight a modern war are about 30 / 40,000. And the number is growing: Biden's threat to "arm Ukraine more" makes no sense, because they are already doing it.

Since defending is simpler and cheaper than attacking, the 175,000 men Putin has deployed are not so sure they can win in the short term, and would more likely get angry in a long-running war. Moreover, the Russian economy could not tolerate such a war for more than two to three weeks.

But Putin needs a victory. Covid is falling apart , the Russian industry is unable to produce enough vaccines, the Russians do not trust the government and are not vaccinated in protest, the economy is in ruins and the average life span is just over 60 years. . Nonetheless, the corrupt and dilapidated pension system is running into debt.

The only problem that Putin has to attack is the uncertainty of ending the war in a short time. The rest is not an existential threat to him.

Sanctions could be a justification for hunger, for example. A little bit of propaganda is enough. Arming the Ukrainians could be an excellent pretext with which Putin would ask citizens for loyalty. These are not existential threats to either the government or the country.

Biden didn't threaten anything.

The real question that arises concerns the displacement of his soldiers. He could have deployed them close to the guerrilla zones dominated by pro-Russian warlords, such as the Donbass.

But he deployed them in front of ethnically hostile areas, when he had a secured corridor. Yet he NEEDS a quick win. This suggests one thing: Putin does not trust his pro-Russian warlords. Or they no longer obey him.

After all, they are very sensitive to the dollar, and for Americans buying them could also be very simple: “bagsful of money”.

If this is the question, if anything, Putin's problem is that he has lost control of the pro-Russian warlords who are fighting. Maybe they have changed their shirts, or they are certainly not reliable enough for Putin to offer Russian troops a corridor on the Black Sea, from which to cut Ukraine out of the sea and go back up for an eventual conquest.

Another thing you notice is that if Putin uses Krimea as a base for the fleet, he is not using it as an aviation base. Yes, there are facilities, but they are not threatening enough with respect to strategic importance: with a Black Sea that can be filled with enemy aircraft carriers, and a Ukraine that could host enemy air bases, the presence of the Russian air force in Krimea and 'inexplicably low.

The real question we should ask ourselves is: "Does Putin REALLY control the territories he thinks he has conquered?"

This is the point. And here is probably the reason why he evaluates an attack, and also the reason why he did not implement it.

But a complex situation, when a quick victory is called for, only requires faster and more brutal military intervention.

Again, nuclear tactics .

One way or another, it's back there.

Honestly, I believe that Biden only delayed Putin's plans, forcing him to evaluate new costs, but if Putin himself were in a situation of existential danger (for example, loss of power), he would not hesitate to start a war, attributing all economic disasters, including past ones, to sanctions.

I don't think Biden has changed anything. At most he bought more time.