Kherson
There is a lot of talk about the Ukrainian counter-offensive near Kherson, and I think it will go down in history as one of the most famous propaganda battles of the century. And I say this for several reasons, the first of which is that "initiative", "offensive" and "counter-offensive" are different words that indicate different things.
Let's start by clarifying one thing: there is a subject called military statistics. Military statisticians specialize in comparing tactics, strategies, military doctrines, and weapon systems with global war data. This is very useful for the commands, to find the truth in the smoke of the opposing military propaganda.
For example: the Russians continue to magnify their hypersonic weapons and their very precise Kalibr missiles. But the military statistics deny them: the brand of the very precise and very fast cruise missiles is a very high mortality among the enemy rank officers (generals, colonels, etc). Now, if we look at the high Ukrainian ranks, we quickly discover that there are no particularly significant losses. On the contrary, there are Russian generals, who were killed by snipers.
What does this tell us? That the fantastic Russian cruise missiles (and where to find them) do not exist, that is, they exist materially but do not have the characteristics that the Russians boast: a hypersonic missile with an accuracy of 8 meters would have practically exterminated the Ukrainian general staff, in six months. Considering that hundreds of them have been launched, and the staff is still in place, we can rule out that they have this precision.
Or rather, the Russians are specialists in mixing things. If a missile has 500 km of useful range they declare 500 km, if it has 8 meters of accuracy but only when launched from 40km distance, they declare 500km with 8 meters of accuracy. They forget that either you have 500km of range, O (aut) you have 8 meters of accuracy. You don't have both, and this war has proven it.
A missile that has 500 km of useful range and 8 meters of accuracy, and is also hypersonic, means that a spy sends a message "there is a command center in a truck at these coordinates", and five minutes later the truck jumps. up in the air. Virtually without fail, as long as the spy manages to hide for 5 minutes.
We can safely say that the Russians do NOT have cruise missiles that are BOTH accurate, BOTH fast, BOTH capable of large ranges. You probably have to choose only one thing, giving up the others: either precise, or fast. Either accurate, or long range. Either long range, or fast. But not all together.
Having said that the Russian army is definitely overrated, and we need to reflect on this, what is happening on the ground if we limit ourselves to what we observe? What we observe is an increase in the range of Ukrainian artillery, up to 200/250 km and an increase in equipment. They clearly have more than 16 HiMars declaring, more MLRS than the official ones, etc.
This had an effect: they could hit the bridges over the Dnieper. The Russians crossed the river with about 25,000 men, until they conquered Kherson in the south. The problem is that after the Ukrainians they had long-range artillery and blew up bridges and communication routes.
Now the 25,000 soldiers cannot advance due to lack of logistics, but they cannot go back either because the bridges have been blown. When a division of yours is in this condition, we expect the Russian air force to enter the field to level the Ukrainian artillery, but this is not happening.
One of the clear things in this war is that the Russian air force does not seem to have the latest generation aircraft. Not just fourth, or fourth ++. It seems that they are limited (and it is not known where this limit comes from) to third generation aircraft, with a decidedly poor communications layer.
But the point of this situation is that the Russian generals and colonels must have requested very heavy air force support and have not. Or rather, they did: they asked the air force to take them away. The mayor of Kherson himself, the pro-Russian one, gave an interview from a city that is about 1500 km away.
In fact, in recent weeks there have been systematic bombings of ammunition depots, buildings occupied by Russian soldiers, communication centers and aeronautical radars. Yet, although the accuracy of the bombings is clear, there are few deaths among high-ranking officers. And that means they're gone.
In short, they have abandoned their men. 25,000 soldiers without commanders, led by ordinary officers, and remotely controlled by their commanding officers.
What happens then? It happens that the Ukrainians have all the time they want (certainly from now until next spring) to cook those 25,000 men. “Cooking” means taking out the radar so that the Ukrainian air force can also be used, and continuing to bomb the ammunition and fuel depots, as they are doing.
They have all the time they want. The Russians cannot escape. The pontoons will still work for one or two months, then the Dnieper will become very difficult to cross.
And that's why there is no counter-offensive. It is simply a matter of taking the initiative using more capable artillery in range. But there is no Ukrainian offensive (after all, they don't have the strength).
But then why did they make people believe in a counter-offensive?
Because if the counter-offensive doesn't exist, it can't fail. The Russians can also wear out their vocal cords to say that the counter-offensive has failed: they will never have anything to show to the public.
If a counter-offensive by hundreds of thousands of soldiers had failed, in fact, the Russians could show tens of thousands of prisoners. But since there is no offensive, they cannot show anything.
In a nutshell, one can speculate that the Ukrainian plan is this: cooking the Russians using long-range artillery, blowing up their stocks and bridges, hitting them when they create barracks, and bringing them to winter dispersed in small groups without logistics. For 25,000 men, surviving a winter without logistics is impossible. If you then divide them because when you combine them they are bombed, even communications become impossible.
Can those 25,000 men slowly flow across the river somehow? Even assuming they were excellent swimmers, to do so they would have to somehow drop the position and let Kherson conquer. So, the strategic situation is this:
- The counter-offensive does not exist. This is an expansion of the artillery range, which makes it possible to take the initiative. If it doesn't exist, it can't fail.
- But if the Russians abandon Kherson, it will be said that the counter-offensive was successful.
- But if the 25,000 Russians lose men and men, and / or defect, the counter-offensive will be said to have succeeded.
In practice, it is a counter-offensive that does not exist, but will materialize in propaganda, at the precise moment when those 25,000 Russian men, abandoned by their generals and without logistics during the winter, will begin to suffer the effects of months and months under Ukrainian artillery.
For now, all that is seen is that the Ukrainians have weapons of greater range. It is always true that artillery is the god of war, but apparently the god of the Ukrainians has it longer.
Of course, the Russians can still do something: deploy the air force and take control of the skies, blowing up Ukrainian artillery.
But so far, for mysterious reasons, the Russian aviation is fantastic and where to find it has not been shown.
One wonders if it exists, and if it is in a condition to fly for a long time and for a long time.
And this, if true, explains why Putin has returned aggressive and threatening. He explains why he is accusing the US of being a belligerent party. Explain why he is doing everything to turn off the gas. (even at the cost of admitting a tremendous dependence on Siemens turbines).
The problem is that it cannot manage, perhaps not even politically, the collapse of 25 abandoned tactical battalions behind the Dnieper. If what I think is true then we will see it much more threatening in the next few days.