May 3, 2024

The mountain of shit theory

Uriel Fanelli's blog in English

Fediverse

Nuclear tactics, dirty bombs, and why I’d stay calm.

Putin has been threatening the use of nuclear tactics for months now, and the newspapers continue to explain what they are, making catastrophic mistakes. I have not protested so far, but now Di Feo also gets into it, and so I have to write something. Not because di Feo is clearly pro-Russian, but because he is clearly incompetent.

First thing. It is not power that distinguishes between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. For several reasons.

The first is that even the "definitely strategic" nuclear devices, such as the MIRV ICBMs, those that carry many warheads, do not have enormous powers. It has been seen with experiments that a single 1 megaton explosion destroys much LESS than 4 250Kt bombs, to give a theoretical example. This is due to the particular way of exploding that atomic bombs have. So even in the case of strategic warfare, it is worthwhile to launch many smaller warheads.

I know you get excited about the 57 megaton Tsar Bomba, but with 57 megaton bombs you devastate much more territory, and with 570 100 kilotons you can destroy even a MUCH bigger area than the Tsar Bomba destruction area. .

Having said that, let's clarify: a warhead is not "tactical" nor because it is only 10Kt, nor because I launch it on a short-range missile. It's tactical if I use it on the battlefield.

But if I throw it on a city, it's definitely a strategic action. In the case of Japan the reason is obvious, given that the bombs induced the Japanese to surrender, obtaining a radical change in the whole geopolitical scenario. It was definitely a strategic bombing.

In other cases, destroying a city of industrial size inflicts serious damage on the affected nation, decreasing its defensive capacity (it removes recruits from the army, destroys industries useful for the war effort, etc.). And so it's still strategic bombing. Even with 10Kt. (The Hiroshima bomb, to understand).

So, let's understand: when we say "tactical" nuclear device we mean that it does not fall on cities (it becomes strategic very quickly), but is used on the battlefield.

But this transforms tactical nuclear weapons into weapons that must be known to use, and especially into weapons that must be "able" to be used. So let's open a parenthesis: how nuclear weapons explode, and especially those of small power.


What you see above is a “Davy Crockett” bomb, a field bomb used as a team weapon. It has a power of "sle" 44t, equivalent to forty-four tons of TNT. Not "kilo", not "mega", we are talking about tons equivalent.

Or rather, he had. It was a weapon of the 50s / 60s, and now it has been replaced by atomic ones such as the W54 or the W72, in turn replaced by the B61 that you can also find in Italy, with explosive warheads with variable power.

When it was tried on the field, however, it was seen that (unless the tank was hit), the armor already survived a few meters from the explosion. Sensors showed that the crew would die anyway, due to the neutrons from the explosion activating the atoms in the armor, turning the tank into a radiation furnace, which would quickly burn and kill the soldiers.

But by themselves, the mechanical and thermal waves were comparable to those of any heavy artillery salvo. It was, however, MUCH more dangerous, because within a radius of nearly three hundred meters the dose of momentary radiation due to the explosion (the immediate release) was fatal, or incapacitating. Within 170 meters it was deadly almost instantly, then the effect subsided but the soldiers could not fight, blind and burned.

Why is this happening? Mostly modern small bombs are more powerful bombs that are limited. It means that an adjustable bomb from 0.1 kilotons to 120 kilotons, such as those housed in Italy and Germany, are 120Kt bombs which can be lowered, by tampering and adjusting the explosive lenses, the power.

Atomic bombs emit their power in three ways. Thermal, mechanical, radiant.

The thermal power is generally released by compressing the gases, temporarily heating the surfaces and expanding the volume of the gases themselves. The result is of very short duration, and as the hot gases tend to rise, although the thermal effect is enormous, it is not what turns into death. It is huge, impressive, but in the case of small arms, if you want a bombing of the same power you can do it using conventional explosives and starting a "firestorm": the city burns anyway.

The mechanical power of a nuclear bomb is apparently enormous, but it is not very efficient: the ground reflects the wave almost immediately. For this reason the mushroom rises in the air several kilometers in a few seconds: this means that a considerable thrust accelerates the center of the explosion with a considerable speed. We are talking about thousands of meters in a few seconds.

So, although the enormous power makes the mechanical component devastating, again it is not very effective when it comes to small weapons, because it mostly blows upwards.

Immediate radiation, on the other hand, with small arms is a completely different kettle of fish.

The trouble is that immediately, at the moment of the explosion, a very high-energy radiation front is created. These first spread into the so-called "fireball", a very high energy gas / plasma bubble, and then a very high energy radiation wave is created.

This flash, and its effects, are hardly visible with the first generation bombs (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) because the radiation destruction apparently appears later, when the damage is counted, and because the mechanical and terminating destruction are impressive to them. time.

But when you use modern small arms, you immediately discover an interesting thing: in practice, "small" weapons behave like neutron bombs, since the amount of people who died of radiation in the initial shock far exceeds the damage done. thermally and mechanically.

The davy Crockett, now replaced by another "adjustable", is one of the examples. You can think of nuclear battle weapons as small neutron bombs, as radiation mortality exceeds shockwave and heat.

If you throw a "davy crockett" into the fray in a tank battle, it will happen that all tanks in a certain radius will become radioactive ovens and the crews will burn inside, or die days later. this is because the metal of the armor will be "activated" by the neutrons: it will absorb neutrons and then decay emitting radiation.

If you throw it on the infantry, well, clearly the men burn alive almost immediately.


That said, a pitched war with tactical nuclear weapons consists of hitting high concentrations of soldiers or strategic and logistical bases using small-power weapons, where small-power doesn't mean they are tactical: it means we expect everything to go roast . 'within a radius of hundreds of meters, even if the explosion can be modest.

So how does war change if these weapons come into play? The armies must be divided into very small units, very coordinated and very fast, to minimize the opportunity to suffer a lot of damage to many soldiers / tanks / whatever. Logistics itself must become MOBILE, which NATO does but the Russians are showing great shortcomings in implementing, and of fixed bases, especially with the staffs inside, you really don't have to talk.

Clearly this is the opposite of what the Russians do, as far as we can see. What does it mean?

It means that a war with tactical nuclear weapons is exactly the kind of war that Russia (as far as we see in Ukraine) cannot do . And therefore, if the Ukrainians had the same weapons, Russia would be in serious trouble.


Now the problem remains "but who would give tactical nuclear weapons to the Ukrainians"? The problem is more complicated than it seems.

The first point is that when the USSR fell, the Ukrainians came into possession of about 3000 nuclear weapons, half of the arsenal. Since the Ukrainians preferred to become a neutral nation (like Switzerland, so to speak) they stipulated the Budapest memorandum, with which they said "we return their bombs to the Russians, in exchange everyone – including Russia – recognizes the position of neutrality. and no one must threaten us anymore ”.

The weapons were then returned to Russia. But the Ukrainians still have, of course, all the know-how to build and dismantle them. One of the largest dismantling factories of old Russian ICBs, to say, is in Ukraine.

Why am I saying this? Because there are two ways the Ukrainians can have tactical nuclear weapons, if the Russians also use them.

  • some country, in retaliation, could give them to him.
  • they can make them using materials from nuclear power plants

we explain one piece at a time.

Using nuclear weapons intended as weapons of mass destruction is prohibited. The trouble with any treaty limiting weapons is that if an enemy violates it, you can't sue them for damage. No, not even in The Hague or Nuremberg.

So what do these treatises say about "otherwise"?

They say retaliation is acceptable. And the retaliation can take place using prohibited weapons and techniques: as if to say "to punish you for having done the bad, we also allow your enemy to be bad". This is because suing the enemy for damage during a conflict is not taken very seriously, but retaliation with prohibited weapons is.

For example, in the Second World War the Ethiopians began to use dum-dum weapons (*), which were forbidden (the British sold them to them). Then Graziani collected the photographic evidence of ~ 300 Italian soldiers who died from the dum-dum, and obtained permission to retaliate, unloading 300 mustard gas bombs on the Ethiopians.

Why always 300? Because the treaties say that the retaliation must be proportionate , even if they do not say what the proportion is. So it could have been 10: 1 for the Nazis, like General Graziani's 300 bombs for 300 deaths. And it was legal (Graziani was never tried for chemical weapons, but for other minor things).

This explains why Israel can legally react as it reacts to attacks: a Hamas-style terrorist attack is a war crime, and therefore they can retaliate, even using prohibited techniques.

Good. The first point therefore is that if the Russians used tactical nucleated weapons, the Ukrainians would be entitled to retaliate, using weapons of another kind, equally prohibited (including chemical and bacteriological). And it would also be legal to give them to him.

But if no one gives them any, they have another option: get them. They have the technology (if you don't want a state-of-the-art nuclear power and you just need an ADM, today making a little boy is relatively simple for a PhD in physics), they would lack fuel, that is fissile material to be to use.

This is where the Zaporizya nuclear power plant comes into play.

A nuclear power plant uses about 10% enriched uranium, the rest is normal uranium. To make a bomb you need an enriched fissile material, at least around 70%, in the case of plutonium which is better as an explosive.

It just so happens that if you put these uranium rods in the plant and run it, after a few hours you will begin to see neptunium appear in the rods. Which does nothing and actually dampens the reaction. But if you wait like three days, you will see plutonium 238 and plutonium 240 appear. The second is fissile but does not maintain chain reactions so you can't bomb it. But with Plutonus 238 the bombs the fairies and how: it is much easier to compress to make it reach the supercritical mass, and requires much lower amounts of fissile in comparison to the power. (also) For this Nagasaki was more powerful than Hiroshima.

From here you understand that the Russians are nervous, when it comes to nuclear power plants: the Ukrainians have the know-how to make the atomic bomb, and also the sources of plutonium which (even if it should be further worked and enriched, mind you) are relatively abundant.

Maybe this way the whole mess of Zaporizyia is clearer to you, and why the Russians interrogate and torture the leaders of the nuclear power plant?

That is, if the Russians, upon entering Zaporizya, have noticed shortages in the used rods or in the plutonium-based waste, they might be relatively frightened by the idea that the UKrains are making simple but effective atomic bombs, to be used as ADM.

An ADM is a nuclear "mine" that you place in front of the enemy, wait for its passage and detonate it at that moment.


That said, the Russians are unlikely to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine, because if by chance the Ukrainians also had the same weapons, or received them silently, the Russians would find themselves in a war which, not having a mobile army, dispersed and connected, it would become even more difficult for them to fight, and would give the Ukrainians even more advantage.

Furthermore, if some bombs did not explode, the Ukrainians could sell the unexploded one to NATO, which would study the technology. In order to have one to take apart, NATO could also give a lot to the Ukrainians.

The "dirty" or "radiant" bombs remain.


A dirty, or radiant, bomb is the radioactive correspondent of a chemical weapon, except that instead of spreading highly poisonous material, it scatters highly radioactive material.

Its usefulness on the battlefield is simply ZERO. They are heavy substances, however, and tend to sink into the ground. They also kill soldiers very slowly, which means months and months. You don't stop the enemy: you piss him off right now.

It can be used on cities, to force evacuation and hit the economy. But in that case, it becomes a strategic weapon, because its use is strategic: hitting economic and productive centers reduces the possibility of arming, and therefore it is a purely strategic function.

It can poison streams to make a river valley radioactive, and make agriculture impossible. But even in this case, it is a strategic and not a tactical use. Starving the entire enemy people to take away their will to fight is a strategic action.

Why do I tend to point this out? Because "strategic" means "escalation": to balance a war crime of this kind (both in the case it hits cities and in the case it poisons large areas of territory) it would be possible to retaliate with strategic weapons, and given the post also the intervention of neighboring nations, in case the radiation hits them too.

For virtually nil military advantage, it looks more like a propaganda tool than something that could happen.


So I remain very cold compared to the two hypotheses. Both in the case of tactical atomic bombs and in the case of dirty bombs, Russia has more to lose than to gain, and their generals know this well.

However, they know that these WORDS excite the Western press.

(*) bullets with a diameter of less than 20mm containing explosives, in order to explode inside the human body. Over 20mm it's artillery, and you can detonate bullets.

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