France and Terrorists

I see that great emphasis is being given to the fact that France has allowed the release of Italian terrorists, who had found asylum on the spot. The narrative that is made of the thing, however, says a lot about both Italy and France.

The first point to understand is that Italy is not the only country in the world to have a history. France also has one, and all of this happened soon after France withdrew from the colonies, where the colonial occupation forces had their hands free to use "the method", or torture, on local rebels.

68 was wedged on this, which had arrived in France in time (about 69, arrived in Italy about 1976, more or less) and had opened a debate on the methods of the police and the government, which appeared to be hardly republican.

As a result, there were two stories that crossed:

• Italy which used rather casual methods of "interrogation" (when a guy is thrown out of the window and there is talk of "suicide", I would say that "we are close to exaggeration"), and had passed extremely "special" laws to counteract the terrorism. "Special" simply means "contrary to the democratic order".
• France, which was still having a vast debate regarding human rights, police behavior was "contrary to republican values", that is, to human values, and more. There was a hypersensitivity about it.

At a certain point, France sees people arriving who are accused or convicted of murders and more, but only by reading the documents of the trial and the methods of interrogation one thing becomes clear: Italy still uses procedural and police methods that France abolished, both for the colonial part and for the police part. And he abolished them because he considers them embarrassing.

To say that France gave asylum to the Italian terrorists because it was cool in the salons of the bobos is an exaggeration. It is not completely false, but it is very far from the truth: the Mitterand doctrine existed, but asylum applications were still examined according to the law.

And if we went into the merits, it was discovered that the Italian state, thanks to the various "Cossiga doctrines" was turning towards a situation similar to the South American dictatorships. Secret services that did whatever the fuck they wanted, that sidetracked trials and remained unpunished, police who could kill you by crushing you with a truck, could throw you from a police station window and talk about suicide, and a whole series of things that the "special laws" allowed .

Of course, the Mitterand Doctrine did exist, but it would have been much less easy to apply it if Italian justice, by dint of special laws and exceptions, had not been very similar to that of Pinochet.

It is useless to point out only the Mitterand doctrine as responsible for the political asylums: they occurred due to the clash between TWO doctrines: The doctrine of Mitterand and that of Cossiga.

Cossiga's theory was the following: “Democratic laws and constitutional safeguards are against the security of the state. If the state wants to achieve its goals against terrorists, then it must put aside the constitution and democracy, because only fascist regimes know how to repress crime and terrorism. The more the methods are typical of fascism, the more democracy will be able to defend itself ".

Ultimately, Cossiga in practice cleared "democracy with the methods of fascism", a phrase that seems correct until it is remembered that the difference between democracy and fascism lies precisely in the methods.

The next objection will be: but those terrorists had been convicted, there were sentences and documents. Sure.

And they are probably guilty, since in practice they themselves never really denied it. But the real problem is that the French judges opened the proceedings, opened the investigative documents and discovered… Italian justice. And at that point, making it look like a farce wasn't hard for the terrorists.

If Italian justice had worked as it does in a civilized country, applying the Mitterand doctrine would have been much more difficult.

The problem with the Italian narrative is that the Italian does not perceive how ridiculous, antiquated, violent, uncivilized his own judicial system is. For the average Italian it is enough to know that “there is the sentence and there are the documents”, and something has already been proven. But what only the few who have ever come into contact with the system know (I, for example, came into contact with it for work, as a technical expert) is that the Italian trial is such a mass of procedural shit that the probability of ANYONE to be convicted is constant, and it is 50%. And what is worse, it does not depend on the type of crime.

The French president contested the application of the law on repentants made by Italy, something which Italy only became aware of after the disaster of the Tortora cases: the Cossiga law (which was what Mitterand was referring to) was amended both with the the so-called “Falcone” law (because it was wanted by Falcone and Borsellino) and in 2001, precisely to limit abuses. Not for nothing, it was later discovered that the mafia used "false repentants" both to hit rival families and to hit men of the state that were uncomfortable for her.

In practice, according to the Cossiga law, if a guy declared himself repentant and head of an organization, he could also indicate as his subordinates…. literally anyone, and since the subordinates were not allowed to "repent", there were cases like that of Tortora, or cases in which the magistrate himself took advantage of it to get rid of uncomfortable people, including colleagues. The case of Francesco Andriotta, Calogero Pulci and Vincenzo Scarantino in the Borsellino trial was clear.

It was therefore not strange that Mitterand found the Cossiga law dangerous. Maybe a less inquisitive law would have made his life more difficult.

The second point that the Italian narrative never mentions is that… for a while, no one asked for the extradition of those terrorists.

The Mitterand doctrine, in fact, came out of force almost immediately after Mitterand. No successor of Mitterand, that is, after 1995, applied it. So why weren't the terrorists brought back to Italy IMMEDIATELY?

We are talking about 25 years of "bonuses" that the terrorists have received, simply because no one in Italy made an extradition request anymore. There was one against Battisti, but it was thus announced that Battisti fled to Brazil.

And the others?

If you enter the debate immediately half of the tavern starts muttering about intellectuals and Communists who infest France (the PCI had many more votes to tell the truth), but no one explains how "French intellectuals" and " radical chic communists of Paris ”to prevent the ITALIAN prosecutors from asking for the extradition of the terrorists in question.

The point to understand is that the years of lead were not the struggle of good against evil. The warring factions were not two, but "one and a half". Here begins the point. The secret services of the period were not even unified, there were many, and they were a riot of characters in search of careers, who operated in a regime without controls (or almost) and each one felt its purpose. Let's say that there were two secret services competing on a specific problem, and one of them wanted to put himself in a good light: he could do something good, or he could disqualify the competitors by making them fail.

It means that in order to disqualify the work of the secret service X, the secret service Y would have helped the terrorists. Take for example the case of the kidnapping of General Dozier: he was a NATO brigadier general, and was apparently kidnapped by a commando of runaways who disguised themselves as plumbers. He was NATO commander in southern Europe at the time. We are in the middle of the cold war.

Now, let's go back.

A runaway team has to figure out where the hell the NATO commander lives, check what security measures have been taken to defend him, figure out how to evade them, kidnap him without anyone giving an alarm and keep him hidden for days. The runaways must therefore know where you live (and I doubt if he was on the phone book), follow him or monitor the house to know that he is home at the time of the kidnapping, and to know that there is no fucking thing with him. Navy Seal opening quam cozzae.

It is absolutely clear that someone helped them, and you don't have to go very far to figure out who: either it was the services of the enemy (the Soviet bloc) or it was the local services.

Why can we rule out enemy services? Because the terrorists tried to negotiate the delivery of the general with the Bulgarian (ie Communist) secret service, but the services agreed that it was too "hot" and that moving him would be too difficult. It was therefore not a kidnapping organized by them.

Let's ignore the fact that the Bulgarian secret services HAVE BEEN CONTACTED by the runaways in question, and not vice versa: is it possible to know who gave the telephone number of the Bulgarian secret service to those four idiots? There was no Internet, there was nothing. You are Italian armed communists and you want to call the Bulgarian secret services. What number do you make?

So who had helped them? The same is true of the murder of Aldo Moro and others.

The truth is that in those years there was no "good versus evil", but a kind of brawl where every secret service and every politician rowed against their opponents. And the kidnapping of the general (who was held hostage for 42 days without anyone finding him) was one such story. Moreover, the number of branches and dens that the RB had in Rome was so high that only a contiguity with some institutions could explain it. If you are illegal, go to the mountains, not a stone's throw from the interior ministry.

The point, therefore, is that Italy did not ask for extradition for more than 20 years after the end of the Mitterand Doctrine, simply because the officials who had "fought" the strange war between "a faction and half "that had fought.

Then there is a more "extreme" question, if you like. Imagine you WANT to take people who are in another country right after the border. We are not talking about Brazil, which presents logistical difficulties in transport. Let's talk about France. The place where an Islamic terrorist crosses the whole country by train.

So, first comes Schengen and knocks out the border. You can pass without problems and without anyone checking you. You have secret services.

Do you know how long it takes before your secret services kidnap 5 people and take them to Montecitorio? It's gonna be a month to organize this. Not more'.

But let's get out of the extreme too. Such an operation was not necessary.

We also go to the defense of the Italian accused: in 2004 the French state authorized the extradition of Battisti, who must flee Brazil. We can therefore say that the Mitterand doctrine ended at that moment.

17 years have passed from 2004 to today. Why did they give themselves 17 years of freedom to the terrorists?

Why am I asking? Because Italian fiction aims to prove things that are NOT true:

1. that the Mitterand doctrine ended with Macron a week ago. False. The truth is that it ended AT LEAST in 2004, at worst, when Battisti's extradition was granted.
2. That it was France that handed over the terrorists. False. France responded to a request from the Italian state. Why now and not 17 years ago?
3. That this is due to a change in policy. No. All presidents since Mitterand have always said that the Mitterand doctrine was over and that they would have nothing against extraditing the terrorists.

If we want to ask ourselves why the terrorists found refuge in France, the answer is the Mitterand doctrine. If we want to ask ourselves why they have been able to live there since 1995, the answer is that it was the Italian Doctrine.

And nobody wants to talk about this doctrine today.