M5S …

I see that the fall of the M5S is raging in the Italian newspapers, which, as expected, is disintegrating. His political godparents, that is, the British secret services and then the Chinese ones (who colonized him immediately afterwards) have stopped investing, and as if that weren't enough Grillo is aging really badly, becoming an incognito old man.

To explain this parable I will repeat what I have said many times: the parties we call "populists" are not really "populists". A populist was Julius Caesar, as much as (or a thousand times as much, as Silla said) his mentor, Mario. Napoleon was certainly a populist, to give another example. Lenin was populist, Berlusconi was populist.

And if we start saying this, you understand that we are playing a completely different championship compared to Grillo, Meloni and Salvini, but not only that: it is quite another sport.

And this is because the Grillo, Meloni, Salvini are not "populists": the correct term is "tribunizi", which takes up the history of the so-called "Tribunes of the Plebs".

So: in Roman times you didn't have any demonstrations. The government did them. I'm not kidding: you were invited to the square (and going there was the highest duty of active citizens) to listen to this and that politician (when not consul, magistrate or senator) who illustrated his programs. Everything took place under the watchful eye of the army (ok, it was the civic guard, but they were military, they fought like soldiers and were equipped as soldiers: the "black block" would have had some problems), and it was a let's say "orderly" process with which the political class collected, as it were, "polls". If the proposals were welcome, then the guy would get big applause, if they were not welcome … to be honest I don't know exactly what the audience was doing, but I know it was possible to know. (I don't remember if they made him any versacci or shouted insults at him, or both).

In this context the tribunes of the plebs were born. I say "in this context" to indicate the fact that participation in political life was considered a duty if not a privilege: the problem was that among the "guests" there were no plebeians, who therefore could not elect magistrates, and that therefore they could not make their voices heard. Bad.

There was a revolt of plebeians, which today we would call "general strike": instead of working they all went to Monte Sacro and in the end they were able to elect "tribunes of the plebs". A little like the ciompi of Florence, except that the tribunes of the plebs achieved their purpose. Their magistrates were untouchable, had veto power, and other privileges.

The fact that the main power of the tribunes of the plebs was the veto already makes us understand how similar they were to Grillini, Salvinians and Melonians: saying no is the fulcrum of the concept of "tribunice". While it is not the fulcrum of the concept of "populist": populism requires a person who has had (outside politics) huge victories, thanks to which he is credited with semi-divine abilities (Julius Caesar made himself nominated dictator and demigod) and therefore can 'save the country from all its enemies. Berlusconi, for example, was a populist: since he was a successful entrepreneur, blablablabla, and off to the Italian miracle. A demigod, in short.

The tribune of the plebs does not normally have a life of victories to show. To the point that it is easily obscured by those who have even minimal talents: see under the heading Giuseppe Conte, who has obscured all the others because he knows how to dress better than them and is able to speak in an enviable Italian.

But the main point is that the populist, from the height of his past victories (even presumed or boasted, as in the case of Trump) can promise to do things, he has a recipe, he has remedies "against the crisis in which he is our great nation is over ”, that is, he has proposals.

The main quality of the tribune of the plebs, however, is the veto . The fuck off, the NO: NO TAV, no Gronda, NOvax, NO-whatever.

There is therefore a huge difference between populist parties and tribunal parties:

• the head of a tribunal party does not have a life of victories on which to raise a myth.
• the head of a tribunal party does not have an effective program, but a catalytic program: no to this, no to that, let's destroy this institution, let's demolish the other institution.

And therefore, M5S has NEVER been a populist party (it had a hint of populism when it brought in the Nobel Prize winner Dario Fo, in order to build a curriculum, but to the plebeians, who have no curriculum, the curriculum of others it is scary: the expert can exist only on the condition that he can never command ), but rather a court party.

That said, we can read some history books and see how the power of the tribunes ended. And if we look closely at their decline, we find TWO main events:

• at a certain point the patricians gain the possibility of becoming tribunes of the plebs.
• at a certain point the emperor Augustus was named first among the tribunes of the plebs.

with this ends their "power", that is the power that came from below: power changes direction.

To destroy a tribune of the plebs it is sufficient to invest it with any authority.

because the essential characteristic of the tribune of the plebs, and of its power, is that of having a power that comes from below. When there is authority, power comes from the top of authority, and not from the bottom of the people.

Grillo himself could maintain power as long as "he said what the people said": but since he became "the high", (a generic term that indicates very well salami hung to dry) his power comes from authority to be Grillo, to be "above", and consequently his power collapses.

He became "the first among the tribunes of the plebs": but he is not the emperor Augustus.

Another blow to the M5S tribunal structure was given, as happened in Rome, by the fact that a patrician was appointed tribune: I am referring to Conte, who is evidently a "Patrizio", that is, a member of a family elite (the academy) and as if that were not enough belonging to that "intellectual elite" which initially, as a rule, could not access the title of Tribune. When a Nobel laureate like Dario Fo is brought up, who is polemical towards the boring and scholastic academy, and an academic lawyer is put to play as premier, as Lao Tzu said, "if you don't know yourself, you are destined to lose ".

Ultimately, that is, the M5S (as the Lega will do and as the Meloni will do, and as the FN has already done in France) is not a populist party but a tribunal party, and has followed history of the tribunal parties, dying similarly as the tribunes of the plebs died in Rome.

Of course, the history of tribunal movements does not end with Augustus becoming first among the tribunes of the plebs. But all the tribunal movements end exactly as they did: when it comes to power, it merges with the tribunes, who lose their propellant, that is, the power from below.

Populist movements do NOT have this problem: Cesare did not need to be authoritative, his previous exploits spoke for themselves. The same for Napoleon, whose victories gave him authority. Ditto for Berlusconi, who was the "entrepreneur par excellence", and from his past successes he drew authority.

But the courts, not having a leader who can show previous victories, need authority: first it is the people who give it to them, but as soon as they come to power, they take the karisma of the office they hold. But when they put on the mask of the power they wield, they lose the power from below, and they disintegrate.

Even as programs, populists and courts are very different. The populist leader draws from his successful life the recipe to revive the country. So if he is an entrepreneur he takes as an example what he was able to build, if it is Trump "the art of doing business", if it is Napoleon "my victories on the field", but if he is a Beppe Grillo, he draws the recipe… from the people.

But the people, although they talk a lot, do not have an authoritative recipe for reviving the country, and they usually portray themselves as victims: not exactly a success. On the other hand, the plebs are such because they have lost the social competition . Therefore he cannot draw the recipe to save the country from his own experience: not knowing what to do, the tribune rather says what NOT to do, and the proposals that come out of it come from others (the usual Nobel Prize for Economics that pontificates in the case of Grillo, or Borghi speaking thanks to the authority he had from being fired by Deutsche Bank).

Is there a way to maintain bottom-up authority for court parties?

An interesting expedient is that of the Lega, which has taken over the "local autonomies". In this way, the League has institutionalized the "power from below", but it is a smart move up to a certain point: having regional mayors or presidents has two deadly flaws:

1. since the tribunal movement hates curricula because it is against the intellectual elites and "experts", the experience of regional governors or mayors CANNOT come to power. So far the regional presidents and mayors, however successful they have been, are in fact excluded from the national ruling class.
2. sooner or later the "representatives of the plebs" become a danger to the leadership, since THEY are the ones who talk to the plebs. They are closer to the plebs and they listen to their voice, they speak their dialect. A serious danger for the national elite who instead speak Italian and inevitably move away from the plebs.

A League government is therefore condemned to talkative mediocrity, because at the end of the day it is unable to transport the administrative experience of those who have one to the top.

Another expedient, which I call the “Pasolini expedient”, is that of Meloni. It is about taking the worst of the worst of the scum of the suburbs and slums, and showing oneself at ease among that, showing that "side with the least". This method works in the short term, but has even worse flaws.

1. the first is that it does not allow the formation of a credible ruling class. If I ask you who will be the next finance minister of a hypothetical Meloni government, you will stammer the names of old Missini bolts, but the truth is that you have no idea. And you have no idea why an ideal people who speak the Lazio dialect, scatarra and is a porter for a living and yes, a proof of "closeness to the plebs", but for any ruling class capable of speaking without shouting, the position is attractive as much as an ingrown toenail. And even as mayors and governors, Meloni does not shine, so the problem is not that the ruling class does not reach the top, but in the fact that it is not formed at all.
2. plebeians don't just stink. They are also the ones most exposed to organized crime. Basing a party on the plebs of the suburbs exposes the party to the mixture with criminal elements. Not because the party itself is criminogenic, but because the plebs of reference are. Pasolini invented that the policeman was a southern peasant (in reality he was a southern young man who had failed at school), Meloni imagines that the unemployed person in the worst suburbs of Rome does not live on petty crimes, and that he wants to be emancipated.

Under these conditions, any attempt by Meloni to form a government will disintegrate both in the lack of valid and fresh names, and in the fact that its local ruling classes will be continually targeted by inquiries due to the proximity of the party to a segment of the population that , for economic reasons, it is criminogenic and has developed a paracriminal culture.

To this is added a general inadequacy of the Italian political class, which "elects a technician" every time dark moments arrive: since the "technical government" is only a government WITHOUT politics, this mechanism alone shows the inadequacy of all parties.

But in the case of the Lega and Meloni, this inadequacy is not only ostentatious (they are allergic to "experts"), but also structural: they are unable to procure a competent ruling class.

Which ultimately means that the two parties (Lega and Meloni) are two tribunal parties that have found a way to survive the embrace of power, but unable to form a competent political class, are doomed to disaster at the precise moment in time. which they take power without having a face (as they did with Conte) that has a minimum of respectability, at least aesthetic.

In other words, these are two parties that have an expiration date, like that of Grillo.

They can survive a few more years as long as there is no crisis, and as long as they are not asked to provide a ruling class of proven competence.