Ukraina and Hrim-2 missiles
The thing about the explosions in Krimea is making headlines in the newspapers, not so much because of the modest loss of a few planes by the Russians, but because of the doubt about "how" they were caused. The doubt that spreads everywhere is that the Ukrainians have put into production a missile that they themselves had designed, the Hrim-2, or Grim-2, or Grom-2, in short Грім.
The first to be frightened are Russians and Belarusians. The reason is linked to the particular way of fighting that the Russian army has. Russia is a huge country. And it has very few inhabitants, the same density as Greenland, to understand.
To defend such a border and such a territory with conventional weapons it had to develop a terrestrial logistics (it is definitely not a thalassocracy, or a power of the seas) based on railways and roads. The Russian correspondent of the “railway genius” is immense, and the train network can carry entire divisions around Russia in a few days.
Sure, the railways are hard to defend, they are easily bombed, and rail bridges are hard to rebuild, especially in freezing winters. But they are trained to do this, and anyhow they get where they can, they fortify themselves, put their logistics there and then go on the mass attack using the artillery to clear the way. They choose a line to advance and bomb Abbestia. We are seeing it in Ukraine.
But how far can they go from the rear depots? At present, as far as we have seen, about 100 / 120km. Why'?
Because since they have few soldiers they have based the army on a tactical battalion model, as they say "a lot of iron, little meat". It means they are heavily armored (tanks), and highly mobile (military transport vehicles for artillery and men).
Good. However, this greatly shortens their autonomy: iron drinks, eats and consumes MUCH more than men. With a Legion, the Romans could march up to 2000 km, and with little food (even found on the spot) and good shoes they reached everywhere. Iron is something else: tanks drink fuel galore, transport vehicles ditto, and violent but imprecise artillery requires a lot of shots, and a lot of spare parts.
If a well-built 18-year-old soldier can go one year without a health problem worthy of treatment, a military campaign vehicle lasts for two months, then something needs to be repaired. Multiply by thousands of vehicles, and you immediately notice the continuous flow of spare parts and mechanics you have to support.
So the logic is that of the jumper: they start attacking and level 100/120 km in front of them. They stop. The engineers leave and move the logistics. They build support bases and warehouses. And off with the next 100 / 120km.
Now the problem will be: and what if the enemy aviation bombs your logistics? Good question, and that's why NATO counts a lot on air superiority, and that's why the Russians dispose with S-300, S-400, S-500. ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-500_missile_system ). These latter missiles are designed to protect the rear.
But what if someone uses very fast missiles or guided artillery shells that travel over 120km? Eh, it happens that moving around is a problem for the Russians. They can't go any further so as not to be decimated by an enemy waging gang warfare. Like the Ukrainians.
But if it is 120km from its logistics, it loses the logistics anyway.
This is the reason why the Himars were a game changer, even if the US gave weapons with a limited range, about 80Km.
But how far does the Grim pull? And where are they ?
The Grim Problem
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hrim-2
is that its range is limited to 280 km by a (slack) treaty that prohibits the construction of tactical missiles with higher ranges. The trouble is that the treaty is loose, the Ukrainians are in a defense situation and that missile reaches 500km of range.
This changes the games, radically. It means that the jumper doesn't work anymore, because the Ukrainians can hit the logistics even when it is very far away. And since Krimea is technically ukraine and dombass is also, as long as they use them there, they are pulling them into their own home.
But in fact, there is no place in Ukraine where the Russians are safe, and Belarus must also be afraid.
The next question will be: can't the Russians locate the factories and destroy them? If I'm in Ukraine, theoretically yes.
The trouble with this missile is that it was built with funding from the Saudis, who have a license to produce it, even if they don't state how many they have, and they don't claim to operate them. The second problem is that they could actually produce them. The third problem is that they have so many good reasons to produce them: the Russians are sponsors of Iran, which is fighting the Saudis in Yemen, and supplies them with very dangerous drones. If the Saudis start building Grims for the Ukrainians, not only are they far beyond Russian range, but they could then negotiate, putting pressure on Russia, for something to improve their conflict in Yemen.
That the Grims are being built in Ukraine in great secrecy, or that Ukraine has licensed some other country (Moldavia? Romania?) To produce them, the point is that they would represent the Russian's Achilles heel.
But not only.
The relative power that NATO has to influence Ukrainian decisions, for example in case of partition of Ukraine, is given by the Ukrainians' dependence on some advanced technologies, such as Himars or Kpz2000.
But this addiction is linked to the fact that Ukraine cannot produce anything similar, at home or abroad under license. For example, one of the Neptune missile factories has been destroyed, but Neptune's first customer is Indonesia, and it is not known how many it has received so far and how many it has in stock.
In general, weapons can also be produced abroad, especially in countries that are interested in acquiring the know-how.
The fact that Ukrainian weapons of this importance appear means that Russia can no longer put pressure on the US to limit the range of weapons it supplies.
If it turns out that, in any way, the Ukrainians know how to make weapons of this type, it happens that:
- NATO has less influence. The Ukrainians can aim to free whatever they want.
- the Russians are in the predicament of being short of breath. Without logistics, they risk disaster.
What can we still expect? If the war lasts and a part of the country continues to work, and there is enough money, we will soon hear about another name – Vilkha-M.
Can the Russians change their army's structure and doctrine of warfare? No because of the budget, but even if they had a budget, they might get an army capable of fighting again in Ukraine, but they wouldn't have the army they need to protect their country.
The Russian military doctrine MUST be peculiar, for the reason that they have a very peculiar problem, which is an immense and rich territory, many different neighbors, and huge borders. With few people, however not very happy to enlist: Russia is not the USSR which had 400 million inhabitants, it is a country of 120 million with an average third world life and a terrible problem of denatality.
If the Ukrainians really managed to get a piece of artillery or a tactical missile with a range greater than 120Km, and to make it at home, the course of the war is destined to change. Especially during the winter.